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STEPPING ONTO A MOVING TRAIN: THE COLLISION
OF ILLEGAL LOGGING, FORESTRY POLICY, AND
EMERGING FREE TRADE IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST
Robert M. Crowley
Abstract: Faced with economic decline following the Soviet Union's collapse,
Russia is energetically seeking ways to develop its economy and stimulate trade. In order
to accomplish these goals, Russia has taken a number of steps to improve its interactions
with its trading partners and reform its internal economic structures. Among the most
sweeping areas of change are Russia's steps toward bilateral and multilateral free trade
agreements and the proposed changes to its Forest Code. Externally, Russia has signed
an agreement with China to stabilize relations, increase trade, and address shared
environmental concerns, and has taken steps toward membership in the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). Internal reforms include revising Russia's Forest Code to
enhance the productivity of the Russian forest sector, encourage investment, and
discourage the problems of wasteful production and illegal logging.
Unfortunately, this simultaneous reform effort may be too ambitious. Given
Russia's underdeveloped institutions and proclivity for corruption, Russia's new Forest
Code may exacerbate rather than solve some of the problems it is designed to address,
particularly that of illegal logging in the Russian Far East. Russia should take steps to
ensure the protection of its Far Eastern forest resources from illegal exploitation prior to
exposing them to the full effects of the regional and global free markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian
government still faces significant challenges in establishing a competitive
economy in the global market. Despite the failure of the Soviet Union's
state-directed economic model, Russia has not successfully transitioned to a
true market economy,' nor has it managed to integrate its economy into the
global marketplace.2 Based on the Russian government's actions to remedy
I See LAURA IVERS, PROGRAMME ON FORESTS (PROFOR), INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN FOREST MANAGEMENT IN COUNTRIES wTH TRANSITION ECONOMIES:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, Moscow, RUSSIA (Feb. 25, 2003), at http://lnwebl 8.worldbank.org/ESSD/ard
ext.nsf/l4ByDocName/SummaryoftheWorkshopsPrceedings$FILE/InstitutinaChangeWrkshpSumnnma
ry.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); see also HISAKO TSUJI, THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR
NORTHEAST ASIA, APEC's NORTHERN FRONTIER: NORTHEAST ASIA (2001) (discussing Russia's
challenges in forming market-based relationships with its neighbors in Northeast Asia); Colin B. Picker,
Neither Here Nor There: Countries That Are Neither Developing Nor Developed in the WTO: Geographic
Differentiation as Applied To Russia and the WTO, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 147 (2004) (pointing out
that several regions of Russia lag behind European Russia's more developed economy).
2 HISAKO TSUJI, supra note 1, at 1; Kim Iskyan, Selling Off Siberia: Why China Should Purchase
the Russian Far East, May 28, 2003, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2086157 (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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its nation's economic woes, it is clear the Russians recognize that the
alternative to global integration is economic irrelevance.3
In order to speed the processes of transition and integration, the
Russian government has undertaken a number of efforts to lift Russia out of
its economic doldrums. Among these efforts are steps toward concluding
agreements to integrate Russia's economy into the global market, and a
reform of the Russian Forest Code.4 First, Russia signed an agreement
known as the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation
Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation
("Cooperation Treaty") with China to improve the quality of their relations,
resolve border issues, and encourage the development of economic ties
between the two countries.5 Second, with the assistance and encouragement
of the Chinese,6 Russia is preparing to enter the WTO. 7  Finally, the third
major step toward a market economy is a revision of Russia's Forest Code,
designed to enhance the forest sector's productivity.8 This legal revision is
perhaps the most risky of the three reforms because it would permit
privatization of Russian forestlands and resources for the first time in
modern Russia's history.
9
The impact of these trade and forestry reforms is likely to be felt most
strongly in the Russian Far East ("RFE"), 10 a region in which both
3 Tamara Troyakova & Elizabeth Wishnick, Integration or Disintegration: Challenges for the
Russian Far East in the Asian-Pacific Region (2003) at http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe2l/publishlnol/
wishnick.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
4 See Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of
China and the Russian Federation [hereinafter Cooperation Treaty], July 16, 2001, available at
http://www.chinaembassy.org.zw/eng/zt/zgdwzc/tl50130.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); Joint
Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, May 27, 2003, available at
http://www.ln.mid.nu/bl.nsf/0/9d22082391597d6443256c85005303el?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 15,
2005); Forest Code of the Russian Federation, Draft Version of Mar. 13, 2004, available at
http://www.forest.ru/eng/legislation/forestcode.htnl (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Forest Code].
5 Cooperation Treaty, supra note 4.
6 Id. art. 17.
7 Picker, supra note 1, at 169-70. Russia's accession to the WTO appears likely to take place in the
near future. WORKING PARTY ON THE ACCESSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN, Dec. 18, 2002, at http://www.wto.org/english
/news.e/news02_e/accessionrussian_18decO2_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). For a discussion of the
current state of Russia's application for WTO accession, see BOGDAN LISSOVOLIK & YAROSLAV
LISSOVOLIK, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE "GRAVITY" OF OUTSIDER
STATUS (Aug. 1, 2004), at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04159.pdf (last visited Apr. 15,
2005).
8 See Forest Code, supra note 4.
9 See id.; see also GERHARD DIETERLE & ANDREY KUSHLIN, WORLD BANK, RUSSIAN FORESTRY
POLICY REFORM: KEY CHALLENGES (2004) at http://www.worldbank.org.ni/ECA/Russia.nsf/ECA
DocByUnid/3447E75C1AE221EAC3256FOE00246EB9/$FlLElForestryRussiaPN2_eng%20.pdf (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005) (spelling out procedures for sales and long-term leases of timber land).
10 For a discussion of the impact of changed trade policy due to WTO membership, see SHAMSHAD
AKHDAR, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, RUSSIAN ACCESSION TO THE WTO: PERSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTS
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overwhelming socioeconomic challenges and tremendous natural resources
are concentrated." The problem of illegal logging in the RFE offers insight
into the interaction of such potential wealth and actual problems. 12 It also
illustrates some of the possible unintended consequences of rushing Russian
reforms. In the RFE, as in Russia as a whole, economic survival depends on
its successful transition to a market economy and integration in the global
marketplace. 13  However, attempting to achieve both goals simultaneousl4Y
exposes Russian society to challenges with which it is ill-prepared to cope.
This Comment takes the position that the Forest Code's provisions for
privatizing Russian forests are likely premature and will result in
significantly greater problems with illegal logging, as well as concurrent
secondary ill-effects on the Russian economy and society. Although its
ambition is laudable, the Russian government should delay its forest
privatization efforts. In the immediate future, the Russian government
should address its efforts towards strengthening its forestry monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms, securing bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements, and phasing in privatization of public forest lands gradually.
This Comment examines the economic problems driving illegal
logging in the RFE and the measures Russia has chosen to combat them.
Part II focuses on economic deformations produced by seven decades of
communism and concludes that inadequate or poorly developed remedies
could exacerbate these deformations. Part Ill explores problems with the
FOR RUSSIAN AND ASIAN TRADE 27 (2002); RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK (Judith Thornton &
Charles E. Ziegler eds., 2002); THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC ASIA: UNFULFILLED POTENTIAL
(Michael J. Bradshaw ed., 2001).
" For a discussion of the region's vast resources, see generally DIETERLE & KUSHLIN, supra note 9;
Iskyan, Selling Off Siberia, supra note 2; RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK, supra note 10. For
problems, see generally RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10.
12 See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, QUICK OVERVIEW FACTS ON ILLEGAL LOGGING IN RUSSIA (Mar.
2004) at http://www.panda.org/aboutwwf/where-we-work/europe/problems/illegal-logging/Downloads/
ILLEGAL%20LOGGING%20RUSSIA.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); Christopher Essick, Crisis in the
Forest: The Environmental Impact of Illegal Logging Under the New Russian Economy, 15 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 245 (2004); Paul Stanton Kibel, Russia's Wild East: Ecological Deterioration and the
Rule of Law in Siberia, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 59 (1994); Stanley R. Boots, Observations from
Afield: The Tension Between the Goals of Russian Environmental Legislation and Extralegal Factors in the
Russian Far East, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 201 (1999). For information on the RFE's overdependence on
raw timber exports, see Jennifer M. Howard, Saving Russia's Forests: The Finnish-Russian Development
Program on Sustainable Forest Management and Conservation of Biological Diversity in Northwest
Russia, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273, 276 (2003).
13 See EASTWEST INSTITUTE, THE CHOICE FOR RUSSIA: COMPETE OR FAIL 2004, at
http://www.ewi.info/pdf/A%20Choice%20for%2ORussia%2OCompete%20or%2OFail%2OJune%2010%20
20041 NEW.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter "THE CHOICE FOR RUSSIA"].
14 DIETERLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 2. See also Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and
Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000) (discussing the problems of self-
dealing and insufficiently developed infrastructure).
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laws, institutions, and attitudes toward law that have undermined previous
attempts to control illegal logging in the RFE, and asserts that each must be
addressed if any future reform is to be successful. Part IV examines the
problems and shortfalls of the trade measures, while Part V examines the
Forest Code provisions Russia seeks to implement as solutions. Finally, Part
VI offers potential remedies.
II. THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST'S TREMENDOUS POTENTIAL FOR GROWTH IS
HINDERED BY THE LEGACY OF SEVENTY YEARS OF COMMUNISM
The RFE is well-positioned to reap the benefits of integration into the
global economy because of its tremendous natural resources, including oil,
gas, minerals, timber, and fisheries.' 5 Encompassing a territory one-third the
size of the continental United States, and stretching from Siberia to Russia's
Pacific coastline,' 6 the region is nevertheless very sparsely populated.
17
Despite its under-population, the RFE has been described as the "backbone
of Russia's industrial development during the twentieth century"'18 because
of the resources it provided. In terms of economic development today,
however, the RFE lags behind the western portion of Russia.' 9 The key
reasons behind the economic problems of the RFE, in particular those
leading to illegal logging in the region, stem from the economic distortions
20
of the Soviet era.
A. The Soviet Regime's Treatment of the Russian Far East as a Strategic
and Economic Colony Hindered the Region's Economic Development
Although the RFE has vast stores of resources and is situated in the
prime trading regions of the Pacific Rim, its primary role during the Soviet
era was as a strategic outpost rather than an area for economic
15 DIETERLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1; see also RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK, supra note
10, and THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC ASIA: UNFULFILLED POTENTIAL, supra note 10 (discussing
the region's wealth of natural resources).
6 The RFE is "[c]omprised of Amur Oblast, the Chukhotka Autonomous Okrug, the Jewish
Autonomous Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug, Magadan Oblast, Primorskii
Krai, the Republic of Sakha, and Sakhalin Oblast." Troyakova, supra note 3, at 4.
'7 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK, supra note 10, at 4.
IS DAVID GORDON, PACIFIC ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH CENTER, PLUNDERING RUSSIA'S FAR
EASTERN TAIGA: ILLEGAL LOGGING CORRUPTION AND TRADE 4 (2000), at http://www.pacificenviron
ment.org/PDF/logging-final.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
19 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK, supra note 10, at 4 & 11; THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND
PACIFIC ASIA, supra note 10, at 8.
20 For information on subsidy dependence, see RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK, supra note
10, at 4-5; THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC ASIA, supra note 10, at 7-8.
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development. 21  The region's geostrategic importance enabled the Soviet
Union to project its power and influence into Northeast Asia.22 As such, its
borders were closed and militarized until 1989,23 and it was cut off almost
entirely from international trade.24 Moscow's approach to the region as a
strategic bulwark made the defense sector the primary actor in the region
and left the RFE highly dependent on the military for its investment anddevelopment needs. 2
During this period of military isolationism, the Soviet government
also treated the RFE's resources as something to be taken from the region
for the benefit of central Russia, rendering the RFE a "resource periphery,"26
and doing little to further development in the region.27 The main products of
the region were raw materials, which were processed or utilized in other
28
regions of the Soviet Union. Raw rather than processed timber was the
focus of the RFE's governmental efforts in the forestry sector.29 The Soviet
government made limited or no investment to build up processing
infrastructures in the RFE.
30
The net result of these artificialities was the development of an
infrastructure "which was way beyond the means of the region's economy to
sustain" on its own.31 Soviet practice distorted the RFE's economy so that it
relied on a steady stream of external capital and investment in order to
function, rather than relying on its own productivity 32 and regional trading
opportunities.
21 M. Titarenko & V. Mikheev, The Asia-Pacific Region and Russia, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A
RUsSIAN JOURNAL, Nov. 3, 2001, at 5.
22 THE RUsSIAN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC ASIA, supra note 10, at 7.
23 Kai-Ching Cha, Can the Convention on Biological Diversity Save the Siberian Tiger?, 24
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1. 3, 8 (2001).
24 Id. at 9.
25 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION ATRISK, supra note 10, at 4.
26 THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC ASIA, supra note 10, at 26.
27 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK, supra note 10, at4.
28 WOOD RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, SECONDARY WOOD PRODUCTS AND MARKETS FOR SIBERIA
AND THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST 6 (2002).
29 id.
30 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK, supra note 10, at 4.
31 THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC ASIA, supra note 10, at 7.
32 Id. at 7.
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B. The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Resulting Loss of Subsidies
Caused Disproportionate Socioeconomic Dislocation and Uncertainty
in the Russian Far East
Many leading economists expected Russia's post-Soviet transition to a
free market economy to be painful but quick.33  While the transition was
certainly painful,34 it was by no means quick,35 and the Russian economy
remains in a transitional state. 6 After a decade of market liberalization and
privatization efforts,37 the Russian Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") in 2000
was only sixty-four percent of 1990 levels.38 Some of this decline may
reflect a correction of Soviet-era productivity overestimates and the shift to
less wasteful economic practices. 39  Even if that is the case, though, the
Russian economy seems to have begun serious recovery only in the early
twenty-first century.40
Despite the RFE's vast resources, the impact of the Soviet Union's
economic disintegration was felt even more strongly there than in the rest of
Russia.4 ' The RFE's dependence on government subsidies and investment
left the region economically unprepared to be "cut adrift" by the Russian
government. 42 The primary reason for post-Soviet economic hardship in the
RFE was the marketization of transportation and energy CoStS.4 3 No longer
ignored in price calculations, these increased costs made it too expensive to
ship goods from the RFE to much of Russia.44 As a result, industries in the
RFE found themselves without a domestic market for their goods.45
33 Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A Case Study in
Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211,212 (2002).
34 See generally Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance, supra note 14.
35 Id.
36 Black, Institutional Reform in Transition, supra note 33, at 212.
37 For specifics on Russian privatization, forestry practice reform, and land privatization, see
generally Black et al., Russian Privatization, supra note 14; see also Lars Carlsson, Towards a Sustainable
Russian Forest Sector (June 11, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing post-Soviet
changes in the Russian economy and forest sector).
38 Black et al., Institutional Reform in Transition, supra note 33, at 212.
39 Mikhail A. Alexseev, Globalization at the Edges of Insecurity: Migration, Interethnic Relations,
Market Incentives and International Economic Interactions in Russia's Border Regions 5 (2002), at
http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/show.pl?type=incoll&nr=634 (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
4o LISSOVOLIK, supra note 7, at 6.
41 Iskyan, supra note 2, at 1.
42 THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC ASIA, supra note 10, at 8.
43 WOOD RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, SECONDARY WOOD PRODUCTS AND MARKETS FOR SIBERIA
AND THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST, supra note 28, at 6.
4 id.
45 Id.; see also Essick, supra note 12, at 251 (elimination of transportation subsidies made goods
from the RFE less competitive within Russia).
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Post-Soviet Moscow's inability to continue its investment in regional
infrastructure exacerbated the region's economic woes.46 Although the Putin
administration has programmed a ninety percent increase in investment in
the RFE from 2000 to 2004, this would still account for just seven percent of
total Russian investment during the same period.47  Such a low rate of
investment does little to reverse the neglect of prior decades or to make the
region more competitive in nearby Asian markets.48
The direct socioeconomic impact of this economic change has been
both profound and grim. 49 The region is a "distant underperforming colony
that is gradually slipping into economic and demographic irrelevance.
Approximately ten percent of the RFE's population has migrated from the
region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 51 Nonetheless, high regional
unemployment persists and more than forty percent of the remaining
population earns less than the official poverty rate.52 As a result, the
standard of living in the RFE is far worse than the already low standard of
Russia as a whole.53
The central government's abandonment of the RFE has had a negative
impact on intergovernmental relations.54 Nine time zones from Moscow and
representing only five percent of the population 55 of the Russian Federation,
56the RFE is remote from the support of the central government. RFE
residents perceive that Moscow has little to offer them and that its priorities
are becoming "progressively disassociated from theirs. 57 Regional leaders
46 Troyakova & Wishnick et al., supra note 3, at 1.
41 Id. at 11.
48 See, e.g. Xiufang Sun, Eugenia Katsigris & Andy White, China and Forest Trade in the Asia-
Pacific Region: Implications for Forests and. Livelihoods, (2004), at http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/publications/China%201mport-Working%20Paper.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2005)
(pointing out that the RFE's neighbors in Asia have a head-start in productivity and competitiveness); M.
Margelov, Russian-Chinese Relations at Their Peak?, 6 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A RUSSIAN JOURNAL 6
(2003).
49 See generally RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10; THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC ASIA,
supra note 10; Iskyan, supra note 2.
50 Iskyan, supra note 2, at 2.
5' RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 4.
52 Id.
13 Id. at 11.
5 Kibel, supra note 12, at 62.
55 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 35.
56 See Elizabeth Wishnick, Chinese Migration to the Russian Far East: A Human Security Dilemma
155 (paper presented at the seminar, "Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia," United
Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, Nov. 21-22, 2002), available at http://gsti.miis.edu/CEAS-PUB/
200209Wishnick.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC ASIA, supra note
10, at 8.
57 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 35.
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appear reluctant to follow Moscow's dictates on trade policy,58 and may be
equally reluctant to follow forestry policies that conflict with their view of
the RFE's interests.
C. Inefficient Forestry Practices in the RFE Produce Even Greater
Reliance on Raw Timber Exports
The RFE's timber resources may offer a partial solution to the
region's economic woes given their size and the proximity of the region to
China, Japan, and South Korea. Recognizing the ready availability of
timber, the RFE's leaders have chosen increased exports as a means to boost
revenue.59  Approximately a quarter of Russia's vast forest resources are
concentrated in the RFE6° and its international neighbors have an almost
unlimited demand for timber.6' As a recent United Nations report on
forestry in the Russian Federation indicates, the RFE's vast timber resources
have tremendous potential to assist in the development of Russia's overall
economy if handled efficiently.
62
Unfortunately, the Russian forestry sector is extremely inefficient,
which limits the RFE's ability to capitalize on its timber resources. Despite
possessing a quarter of the world's forests, Russia produces only a quarter as
much wood as Finland or Sweden.63 Data from the Russian Ministry of
Natural Resources indicates that no more than twenty-five percent of the
annual allowable timber cut, a rough benchmark for a sustainable rate of
exploitation, has been utilized in any of the past few years. 64 Analysis by
outside sources puts the legal timber harvest at between sixteen and twenty
percent of the apparent sustainable annual cut.
65
58 Boots, supra note 12, at 221-28.
59 See Trade Booms in Sleepy Border Town, THE STRAITS TIMES (Vladivostok, Russia), Feb. 12,
2003, available at http://vn.vladnews.ru/Arch/2003/ISS350/News/updl2.HTM (last visited Apr. 15, 2005);
US EMBASSY BEUING, ILLEGALLY HARVESTED RUSSIAN TIMBER ENTERING CHINESE MARKET, BEUING
ENVIRONMENT, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY UPDATE (May 20, 2004), at http://www.usembassy-
china.org.cn/sandt/05-20-04newsletter.doc (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
60 UN ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOREST SECTOR OUTLOOK
STUDY, U.N. GENEVA TIMBER AND FOREST DISCUSSION PAPERS #9, U.N. DOC. ECE/TIM/DP/27 (2003).
61 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 120. The "total annual demand in China, Japan, and South
Korea exceeds 260 million cubic meters [of timber], of which 65% is imported." Id.
62 Russian Federation Forest Sector Outlook Study, supra note 60, at 16.
63 Nick Paton Walsh, It's Europe's Lungs and Home to Many Rare Species. But to Russia it's
£00bn of Wood: Sale of Forests to Loggers Could Create Ecological Crisis, GUARDIAN (UK), Sept. 19,
2003, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/O,, 1045062,00.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
64 Improvement of the Organization of Forest Use, U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, at 1,
U.N. Doc. TIM/SEM.1/2003/R.20 (2003).
65 Press Release, WOOD Markets, Russian Log Exports & Lumber Production Soaring (Mar. 27,
2003).
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Some of this inefficiency stems from the collapse of formerly state-
owned timber producers in the 1990s,66 which cut production volume by
fifty-six percent from 1990 to 2000.67 A portion of the productivity problem
can therefore be viewed as temporary consequences of the transition process,
but other factors are rooted in inefficient practices.
A second component of the inefficiency problem is the incredibly
high rate of waste in Russian timber harvesting operations. An estimated
forty to sixty-six percent of the potential harvest is simply wasted prior to
reaching the marketplace.68 During the early 1990s, as much as half of the
timber harvested rotted where it was felled.69 Recent figures show minimal
improvement in efficiency, estimating that approximately one quarter of
harvested timber is lost in initial processing and transportation, and up to
forty percent more is lost in rough processing for market.70 The root causes
of this waste in production are obsolete technologies and poor organization,
and the net result is either low or no profitability. 71 A recent United Nations
study estimates that approximately half of Russia's forest industry
enterprises are unprofitable. 72
Low labor productivity further degrades efficiency in Russian timber
production. One observer of the region estimates that labor productivity in
the RFE's timber industry is twenty times lower than in western Canada and
the United States. 73 As a direct result, RFE-based logging enterprises are
unable to capitalize on the comparative advantage that relatively low wage
levels normally offer industries.
A final disadvantage is that Russian firms have difficulty meeting the
finished timber quality standards their Asian customers demand. 75  For
example, mills in the RFE are simply unable to provide sawn wood which
meets the requirements of the Japanese lumber market.76
66 WOOD RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, supra note 28, at v.
67 Id. at iv.
0 GORDON, supra note 18, at 6 (reporting that 40-60% is lost in logging or transport). See also
RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 131 (stating that two-thirds of initial raw material is lost between
harvest and market).
69 Kibel, supra note 12, at 62.
70 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 131.
71 id.
72 Improvement of the Organization of Forest Use in Russia, supra note 64, at 15.
73 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 128.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 121.
76 id.
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The combined effect of these deficiencies is that the vast majority of
the RFE's timber that does make it to market is exported as raw logs. 77 In
the Primorskiy Krai, the subregion of the RFE bordering with China, the
current estimate is that eighty percent of legal timber removals are exported
as unprocessed logs. 7  While these exports provide the region with an influx
of much-needed capital, they also preclude access to significantly more
profitable forest product manufacturing.79 Raw logs represent up to 51.5
percent of Russia's total exports, which gives policy decisions in the forestry
sector tremendous impact on the Russian economy as a whole.
80
Because of this reliance on exporting raw timber rather than finished
wood products, Russia's economy is cut off from the profits offered by later
stages of manufacturing. 81 Given the vast timber holdings in the RFE and its
proximity to booming markets, this is a significant foregone opportunity.
82
This is particularly true given the tremendous demand for Russian timber in
China, Japan, and South Korea.8 3 The markets in each of those nations rely
almost exclusively on timber harvested in Russia.
84
D. China 's Demand for Russian Timber Places Further Pressure on the
Region's Forests
Trade relations between Russia and China are asymmetrical in terms
of economic power. While Russia's economy is just recovering from a
decade-long decline, 5 the Chinese economy is flourishing. 6 China is the
dominant economic power in the region, bolstered by a combination of
economic reforms and admission to the WTO. China's economic growth
7' GEORGE SHUVARIN, PACIFIC ENVIRONMENT & RESOURCE CENTER, RUSSIA'S TIMBER TUG OF WAR
(2004), at http://www.pacificenvironment.org/articles/tugofwar.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
78 WOOD RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, supra note 28, at vii.
"' SHUVARIN, supra note 77.
80 id.
81 Essick, supra note 12, at 255.
82 Russian Federation Forest Sector Outlook Study, supra note 60, at 9. See also RUSSIA'S FAR
EAST, supra note 10, at 120 ("[The] total annual demand in China, Japan, and South Korea exceeds 260
million cubic meters [of timber], of which 65% is imported.").
83 GORDON, supra note 18, at 6 ("By 2025 China could face a deficit of 200 million cubic meters of
wood per year, according to a recent study by the Center for International Trade in Forest Products
(CINTRAFOR) at the University of Washington.").
84 Essick, supra note 12, at 246.
85 THE CHOICE FOR RUSSIA, supra note 13, at 12. See also Russian Forest Sector Outlook Study,
supra note 60, at 26 ("At present a sustainable economic situation has yet to take shape in Russia as a
whole, and in the forest sector in particular.").
Margelov, supra note 48, at 11; Xiufang Sun et al., supra note 48, at 2; Brook Larmer &
Alexandra A. Seno, A Reckless Harvest, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 2003, at 1.
87 Larmer, supra note 86, at 1.
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has caused a boom in the private development and ownership of housing,
which has, in turn, increased demand for timber.88
As a result of strict Chinese restrictions on logging imposed in 1998 in
the wake of major flooding and forest degradation, China can no longer
satisfy its own timber demand. 89 Forced to seek other sources, China has
become the world's second largest importer of logs. 9° Roughly half of
China's excess demand is now met with raw log imports from the RFE.9'
Unfortunately, the combination of China's overwhelming demand and
the RFE's vast resources has not worked to Russia's advantage. While the
restrictions on logging are good for China's environment, they have led to
the destruction of Russia's forests.92 In addition to straining Russian forests
and logging enterprises, this combination of forces has exacerbated theproblem of illegal logging in the RFE.9a
E. Illegal Logging in the Russian Far East Is a Significant Economic and
Legal Problem
Current estimates indicate that between forty and fifty percent of the
total timber harvest in the RFE is obtained illegally.94  Illegal harvesting
operations in the RFE employ a variety of techniques, including logging
without permits,95 logging outside of parcels approved for cutting,96
misclassification of species 97 or grade,98 smuggling, 99 documenting through
88 Id.; Essick, supra note 12, at 254.
89 Peichang Zhang et al., China's Forest Policy for the 21st Century, 288 SCIENCE 2136 (2000);
Larmer, supra note 86, at 1; Masanobu Yamnane & Wenming Lu, The Recent Russia-China Timber Trade:
An Analytical Overview 1, at www.iges.or.jp/en/fc/phasel/ir99/4-11-yamane.PDF (last visited Apr. 15,
2005).
90 Larmer, supra note 86, at 1.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 WWF-UK, FIGHTING FOREST CRIME AND THE ILLEGAL TIMBER TRADE 6 (2004), at
http://www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/fightingforestcrime.pdf (last visited on Apr. 15, 2005); ARNOLDO
CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, WORLD BANK, FOREST LAW ENFORCEMENT 8 (2004) (on file with author);
GORDON, supra note 18, at 16.
'4 WYNET SMITH, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, THE GLOBAL PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL LOGGING 3
(2002) available at http://www.itto.or.jp/live/LiveServer/157/tfu.2002.01(03-05).e.pdf (last visited Apr.
15, 2005); MARK PETRY & MURINA MURAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREIGN AGRICULTURE
SERVICE, REVISION OF THE RUSSIAN FORESTRY CODE (2004); GORDON, supra note 18, at 16; WWF, supra
note 12, at 1.
95 Essick, supra note 12, at 246.
96 MARK PETRY & MURINA MURAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREIGN AGRICULTURE
SERVICE, POLICY AND TRENDS IN THE FORESTRY SECTOR 5 (2003).
97 WWF, supra note 12, at 3; RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 331.
98 ANATOLY LEBEDEV, FOREST MONITOR, THE WILD EAST: TREES IN TRANSIT, THE TIMBER TRADE
BETWEEN SIBERIA, THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND CHINA 31 (Oct. 2001), at http://www.forestsmonitor.org/
reports/russia/twecov2.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
99 WWF, supra note 12, at 3.
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cover firms or with false documents, 00 bribing officials,' 0 ' and purchasing
illegal permits.
102
The most efficient illegal logging technique, however, appears to be
exploiting the legal loophole of "sanitary" or "salvage" logging. Set out in
Articles 98 through 100 of the 1997 Forest Code,10 3 this loophole was
designed to enhance the health of Russia's forests by culling fire-damaged or
diseased timber. 104  Although necessary, 10 5 the provision has become a
stimulus for illegal logging because some regional forestry authorities have
come to rely on it as a source of revenue by creating large scale harvesting
operations. 10 6  Forestry officials routinely permit cutting commercially
valuable stands of timber, often in protected areas or involving protected
species of timber.'0 7 More recently, officials set, or permitted customers to
set, forest fires in order to qualify the timber for sanitary harvest. 08 It is
particularly difficult to curb illegal logging when the primary actors in these
enterprises are often the forestry enforcement officers themselves. 109
The direct and indirect consequences of illegal logging in the RFE are
breathtaking in scale. The direct impact of illegal logging on Russia's
economy has been estimated as a loss of US $1 l00 to 3 billion annually.'
The indirect effects of illegal logging may be even more significant in the
long-term. In addition to harming the sustainability of timber resources,
illegal logging deprives the government of tax revenue to enforce
10 Id.
1o1 Id.
'0 CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, supra note 93, at 8.
103 Lesnoi Kodeks Rossiskoi Federatsii [Russian Federation Forest Code], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997,
No. 22-FZ at art. 98-100 [hereinafter Forest Code]. English translation available at LEXIS, Nexis Library,
RUSLEG File. The Forest Code of 1997 superseded the Osnovy Lesnogo Zakonodatelstva Rossiskoi
Federatsii [Russian Federation Fundamentals of Forestry Act], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1993, Act No. 4613-I,
which was Russia's first post-Soviet forest management code.
" GORDON, supra note 18, at 16.
'05 Russian Federation Forest Code, supra note 103, at art. 42 (stating that removal of "fallen, dead-
stand and wind-felled wood" may be effected on the basis of an order by the forest warden).
106 CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, supra note 93, at 8.
107 GORDON, supra note 18, at 7.
's ANATOLY KOTLOBAY & ANDREI PTICHNIKOV, WWF-RussIA, ILLEGAL LOGGING IN THE
SOUTHERN PART OF THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST: PROBLEM ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 9 (2002)
available at http://www.wwf.de/imperia/md/content/pdf/waelder/illegal-lggin-in-the-russian-Far-East.
pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
109 Press Release, Forest Monitor, New Investigations Reveal Devastating Illegal Logging in Russian
Far East (May 10, 2004), available at http://www.forestsmonitor.org/news/press/pressO40510.pdf (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005).
10 WWF, supra note 12, at 2a.
"' US EMBASSY BEUING, supra note 59. For comparison, one estimate of the cost of illegal logging
in Primorskiy Krai alone is as high as US $150 million, which is half of that region's annual budget.
KOTLOBAY, supra note 108, at 15.
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sustainable logging practices1 2 and to invest in Russian-owned processing
industries. 113  Illegal logging also undermines the ability of legitimate
logging enterprises to compete in the market,' 4 deepens the pervasive
corruption in the region, 1 5 and undermines the region's already shaky
adherence to the rule of law." 6  As such, illegal logging represents a
significant problem for a region already beset with tremendous social and
economic woes.
III. ANY SUCCESSFUL POLICY TO CURB THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL LOGGING
IN THE RFE MUST ADDRESS THE STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS
OF THE REGION
A complex web of legal and social issues complicates the prospects
for a short-term resolution of the RFE' s problems. Deeply rooted poverty in
the RFE plays an important role in the prevalence of illegal logging there,
but it is by no means the only factor." 17 The problem of illegal logging is
exacerbated by weak legal system and enforcement mechanisms." 8 Because
of the RFE's myriad difficulties, Russian authorities often cannot solve the
problems, do not understand them, or do not have the legal authority to
act. 119
A. The Current Forest Code Lacks the Necessary Clarity and Specificity
to Be Effective
The main problem with the 1997 Forest Code currently in effect is
that it is unclear. Although the 1997 Forest Code espouses high standards of
environmental protection, it fails to define individual rights and obligations
clearly 120 and does not provide "solid and enforceable standards."'121 Further
112 CONTRERAS-HERMOSIILA, supra note 93, at 15.
1"3 ARNOLDO CONTRERAS-HERMOSLLA, PACIFIC RIM INMATIVE, ILLEGAL FOREST AcnvIIES IN THE
PACIFIC RIM 5 (Sept. 2001) at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/publications/pri-illegallogging2.pdf
(last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
114 SMrrH, supra note 94, at 4.
5 GORDON, supra note 18, at 7. For an overview of the impact of corruption on the Russian
Federation's economy, see generally Scott Syfert, Capitalism or Cronyism? Corporate Structure, Western
Investment, and Commercial Crime in the Russian Federation, 18 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 357
(1999).
116 Essick, supra note 12, at 265; Iskyan, supra note 2.
117 KOTLOBAY, supra note 108, at 17.
118 Id.
"9 Russian, Chinese WWF Sections Join Efforts to Preserve Far East Forest, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, June 23, 2004, at http://forests.orglarticles/reader.asp?linkid=32974 (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
:20 Boots, supra note 12, at 220.
"2' Id. at 203.
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complicating matters, the 1997 Forest Code has been described as being "as
,,122dense and impenetrable as the forest it governs.
The 1997 Forest Code fails to delineate Moscow's responsibilities
versus those of various regional governments with sufficient precision.
123
Timber companies struggle to determine which governing agency is
responsible for a given area of the forest or for the forestry laws
themselves. 124 Companies seeking to adhere to legal forestry practices are
confused and stalled.
125
The 1997 Forest Code also lacks sufficient penalties to deter illegal
logging effectively. The World Wildlife Fund ("WWF") identified an
"inadequate system of punishment for illegal timber harvesting" and
"imperfect legislation" as two key problems which have contributed to
illegal logging in the RFE. 126 In some cases, penalties are so light compared
to potential profits, it remains more profitable to risk discovery than to
follow the law. 27  Further, the current law is such that there are few
repercussions for companies that default on levied fines.
128
B. Russian Forestry Enforcement Mechanisms Are Underfunded and
Poorly Structured to Face the Challenges of Illegal Logging
As inadequate as the current forest legislation is, the system of
enforcement is even weaker. 12 9 The WWF described forestry enforcement
in Russia as "totally inadequate to the new socio-economic conditions of the
country."' 30 The Russian forest services are critically underfunded 131 with
steadily declining budgets. 32 In the face of competition from well-funded
illegal loggers, Russian foresters lack the resources to enforce the laws and
are often simply outmaneuvered.
133
The Russian central government dramatically eroded the effectiveness
of forest protection by eliminating the Forest Service as a separate entity and
122 Walsh, supra note 63.
123 Boots, supra note 12, at 226.
124 id.
125 Id.
126 KOTLOBAY, supra note 108, at 17.
127 GORDON, supra note 18, at 19-20.
2' Id. at 20.
129 KOTLOBAY, supra note 108, at 10; CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, supra note 93, at 8; GORDON, supra
note 18, at 7. See also Carlsson, supra note 37, at 5 ("Even if intentions are good the authorities lack the
means of implementing rules and regulations.").
130 KOTLOBAY, supra note 108, at 10.
131 CONTRERAS-HERMoSILLA, supra note 113, at 5.
132 GORDON, supra note 18, at 13.
133 Boots, supra note 12, at 229.
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merging its functions with the Ministry of Natural Resources in 2000.134
This led to diminished governmental focus on the problems of Russian
forestry.
135
Pervasive corruption in the RFE further undermines the effectiveness
of forestry law enforcement. 136 In a nation with an illicit economy estimated
at forty percent of GDP, 137 the RFE is known as a particularly corrupt
region.'13 Underfunded forestry officials are especially vulnerable to bribery
and corruption, often simply to make ends meet.' 39  In some instances,
forestry officials are approached with offers of cash to stay out of areas in
which illegal loggers are operating. 140  In other cases, the foresters
themselves have engaged in illegal logging operations, 141 either to procure
funding to pay salaries and maintain infrastructure
42 or for personal gain. 143
C. Social and Cultural Factors May Be Even Greater Obstacles than
Inadequate Legislation or Enforcement Schemes
Perhaps the greatest challenge to be overcome in the RFE before
illegal logging can be successfully addressed is that of the population's
"frontier mentality."'144 Russia still faces a Soviet-inspired tragedy of the
commons situation, in which the RFE's vast forests are viewed as
inexhaustible, 145 with natural resources perceived as belonging to everyone
and therefore to no one. 14 6 To some degree, the region's residents manifest
the traditional view that they are free to obtain whatever natural resources
they can and that new laws are intended only to diminish their freedoms. 147
134 Essick, supra note 12, at 266.
135 WOOD RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, supra note 28, at 17.
136 LEBEDEV, supra note 98, at 6.
137 Troyakova, supra note 3, at 36.
8 GORDON, supra note 18, at 7.
139 Boots, supra note 12, at 228; Paul Stanton Kibel, Reconstructing the Marketplace: The
International Timber Trade and Forest Protection, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 735, 753 (1994).
'40 Id. at 229.
' CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, supra note 93, at 8.
142 GORDON, supra note 18, at 7 & 16.
143 Essick, supra note 12, at 254.
'44 GORDON, supra note 18, at 15.145 See Cymbre Van Fossen, The Evolution of a Comprehensive Environmental Strategy in the
Russian Federation, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 531, 534 (1995) ("Because of the unfathomable size and breadth of
the country, people believed that Russia could absorb all wrongs done to it. This mythological belief often
resulted in an 'attitude of complacency towards resource depletion and pollution."').
146 Carlsson, supra note 37, at 31.
147 LEBEDEV, supra note 98, at 6
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The RFE is also plagued with a skeptical view of the rule of law.148 In
the RFE, as in the rest of Russia, there is little expectation that laws will be
enforced. 149 This attitude towards law also has roots in pre-Soviet Russia
because even then czars used law as a tool to control the population, not a
limit on the freedom of the powerful. 50 Consequently, Russians developed
distrust of law and authority as tools of the powerful.'
The view of western capitalism that many in the region have absorbed
complicates the situation further. 152 A current measure of economic success
in Russia is the degree to which an individual can take advantage of the
system. A western businessman working in the region stated that
"[w]e've taught them very well in a short period of time what not to do, and
they are doing it very well."'
' 54
The final, and overarching, factor contributing to poor social attitudes
in the region is deep-rooted uncertainty about the future of the RFE.
155
Given the history of the last decade, residents of the RFE have legitimate
concerns, even extending to whether the region will remain a part of Russia
or be absorbed by China. 56  Such uncertainties create a vicious cycle in
which perceived "high risk discourages commitment in general.' 57  As
such, "[h]igher levels of risk make investors demand higher and faster
financial returns," which discourages long-term planning. 158  This
uncertainty and competition for short-term gain undermines trust in other
market participants, and erodes incentives to adhere to the rules.
1 5 9
148 Boots, supra note 12, at 231. For a detailed discussion of the rule of law as a basis for
development, see Gary Goodpaster, Law Reform in Developing Countries, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 659 (2004).
149 Kibel, supra note 12, at 65.
150 Stanley R. Boots, Note: The Personal Contacts Alternative: A Comparison of Japanese and
Russian Legal Cultures in the Russian Far East Timber Trade, 9 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 257, 286-88 (1997).
151 Id. at 290.
152 Boots, supra note 12, at 244.
153 Id.
154 id.
155 Alexseev, supra note 39, at 37.
'5' Id. at 54. See also Elizabeth Wishnick, One Asia Policy or Two? Moscow and the Russian Far
East Debate Russia's Engagement in Asia, 13 NBR ANALYSIS 1, 47 (2002) ("Unlike their colleagues in
Moscow who emphasize the strategic benefits of Sino-Russian partnership, officials in the Russian Far East
view China as Russia's main competitor in the short-term and as a potential threat in the long-term.").
157 Alexseev, supra note 39, at 37.
58 CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, supra note 113, at 5.
159 Black, supra note 33, at 229.
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IV. THE TREATY OF GOOD-NEIGHBORLINESS AND FRIENDLY COOPERATION
WILL DO LITTLE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL LOGGING IN
THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST
Because the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation
("Cooperation Treaty") does not specify how to carry out policy goals, it is
unlikely to succeed in curbing illegal logging in the RFE. Additionally,
Russia's accession into the WTO's free trade regime may worsen the RFE's
economic outlook in the immediate future.
160
The Cooperation Treaty improves cooperation between Russia and
China, particularly in the areas of economics 6Fand the environment, 162 both
of which have a major bearing on the problem of illegal logging in the RFE.
Its provisions, however, focus on general concepts without adequate
specifics and produce negative unintended consequences.163  Moreover, as
the Cooperation Treaty is not between equal partners,' 64 a fact of which the
Russians are painfully aware, 165 it will most likely do little to resolve the
uncertainty that plagues the RUE. 166 While the Cooperation Treaty does
represent progress in the relations between the two nations, it will likely
have little positive effect on the problem of illegal logging.
The Cooperation Treaty is broadly crafted to espouse the principles of
adherence to international law, recognition of national sovereignty, and non-
interference. 67  With few exceptions, such as Russia's explicit support for
China's position on Taiwan 168 and China's agreement to facilitate Russia's
entry to the WTO, 169 the Cooperation Treaty focuses primarily on broad
commentary without specific points relating to implementation. This lack of
160 See Picker, supra note 1, at 151-152. The WTO looks at the entire state without regard to the
level of development in its internal regions. The result is that the failure to take into account the
differences within countries, from an economic perspective, results in a failure to properly allocate scarce
development dollars. Id.
6 Kai-Ching Cha, supra note 23, at 9.
:62 Cooperation Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 19 & 20.
63 See Natalie Chalifour, Global Trade Rules and the World's Forests: Taking Stock of the World
Trade Organization's Implications for Forests, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 575, 582 (2000) ("Trade
liberalization is another factor that has been identified as an underlying cause of deforestation and forest
degradation.").164 See Part II.D for a discussion of the relative power of the two economies.
165 Yiwei Wang, Beijing Hands Moscow a Long Rope, ASIA TIMEs, Oct. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.atimes.con/atimes/China/FJ20Ad03.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); Alexseev, supra note
155, at 37; Celestine Bohlen, Russians Gaze with Envy, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1999, at Al.
'66 For a discussion of the region's skeptical view of China's goals for the RFE, see Alexseev, supra
note 39, at 37.
167 Cooperation Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1.
168 Id. arts. 4-5. The Russian Federation adopts the Chinese position that Taiwan is not an
independent state, but an integral part of China. Id.
'69 Id. art. 17.
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specificity is particularly noticeable in Article Sixteen, which discusses the
promotion of economic cooperation and trade between bordering regions of
the two countries. 170 Perhaps even more relevant to illegal logging and its
causes is the Cooperation Treaty's further lack of specificity on the
protection of natural resources 17' and in "taking strong measures" against the
activities of organized crime. 172 The Cooperation Treaty is merely a policy
outline, intended to be supplemented with lesser agreements focused on
practice. However, little real progress has been made in securing these
lesser agreements for the areas it identified as important.
73
Considering that the Cooperation Treaty has been in force for more
than three years and that economic cooperation is a priority for both
nations,174 one would expect to see tangible results on at least this front. The
reality, however, is none too impressive. While the two nations have taken
steps to establish free trade zones in border areas and remove tariff barriers,
economic ties between Russia and China remain "weak and unvarying and
lacking dynamism and creativity."'' 75 The Chinese continue to press their
neighbor to the north to establish true free trade between their nations, but
the Russians continue to resist the suggestion.'76
Although a true free trade zone between China and the RFE may
make economic sense, 177 political concerns have rendered it unlikely. Many
Russians are concerned that increased Chinese influence in the region will
mean an erosion of Russian control. 178  The specific articles of the
Cooperation Treaty that advocate mutual non-interference in each other's
internal affairs, 179 prohibit the use of economic pressure, 80 and renounce
territorial claims by either party on the other' 8' do not allay Russia's fears of
Chinese dominance. Given the national distrust of Chinese intentions, it is
'70 Id. art. 16.
'"' Id. art. 19.
172 Id. art. 20.
173 For example, although the establishment of free trade was a key goal, the main effort has been
developing free trade areas along the border. As a result of inertia and mistrust, it took three years from the
signing of the Treaty to break the ground on the first such area. See, e.g., James Brooke, Asia's New Trade
Focus: Siberia Warms to China, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 30, 2004 (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). For a
discussion of why Russia may have taken so long to implement the free trade areas, see Yinwei Wang,
supra note 165.
:74 Cooperation Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 16-17.
175 Yinwei Wang, supra note 165.
176 Id. at 4.
'77 Id. at 5.
178 Bohlen, supra note 165; Yinwei Wang, supra note 165.
:79 Cooperation Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1.
'0 Id. art. 2.
1s1 Id. art. 6.
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unfair to expect that the RFE, faced with greater economic privation and a
more uncertain future, would be any less suspicious.
Another factor undermining the Cooperation Treaty's effectiveness is
that China has little economic incentive to treat Russia as more than a source
of raw materials. With the exception of advanced military technologies,
Russia has little to offer a rapidly developing nation like China.
1 82
Moreover, the Chinese have little reason to encourage Russian economic
development when one of the key factors rendering Russian raw timber so
profitable for the Chinese is its low cost.1 83 This harsh economic reality has
not escaped Russian observers: "[f]or China, it is not profitable for us to be
strong. The weaker we are, the more they can get from us." 184  An even
harsher reality is that Russia may have little real choice in the matter.
The Cooperation Treaty appears to have produced little in the way of
investment in the region from either Russian or Chinese sources. 85
Although six Chinese companies have established logging and processing
projects in the RFE,186 the level of Chinese investment in the RFE remains
miniscule.1 87  When Chinese firms do take the risk of investing in the
RFE, 188 they are often viewed with suspicion by Russians who question their
motives. 189 Further, Chinese enterprises are reluctant to risk too much when
they harbor doubt as to whether Russia will maintain its stability 90
Given the current state of affairs in the RFE, it seems unlikely that
unregulated free trade is the panacea needed to cure illegal logging. 191 If the
Cooperation Treaty were to increase free trade and eliminate trade barriers,
the destruction of Russia's forest resources could accelerate. 92  While
82 Bohlen, supra note 165.
83 Trade Booms in Sleepy Border Town, supra note 59.
:84 Bohlen, supra note 165.
85 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 24.
186 US EMBASSY BEUING, supra note 59.
187 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10.
188 Trade Booms in Sleepy Border Town, supra note 59 ("Right now, they don't observe regulations
and as they are mostly small companies and sole proprietorships, trading with Russians carries great
risks.").
189 RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, supra note 10, at 24.
,90 Yinwei Wang, supra note 165.
191 NIGEL SIZER ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, TREE TRADE: LIBERALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE IN FOREST PRODUCTS: RISKS AND OPPORTUNrrIES 3 (Nov. 1999) at
http://pdf.wri.org/treetrade.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) ("Trade liberalization can be beneficial for forest
conservation and sustainable management if domestic forest conservation policies are well developed and
implemented...").
192 See generally Picker, supra note I (noting that an underdeveloped region may not benefit from
free trade). See also Chalifour, supra note 163, at 582 (arguing that free trade may lead to deforestation
and forest degradation).
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"[miarkets can be the best drivers towards sustainable forest management;
they can also be devastating if not coupled with necessary safeguards."'
193
The Cooperation Treaty has failed to create a true free trade
relationship between Russia and China, to reduce national uncertainty
significantly, or to produce significant levels of investment in the RFE.
Thus, the Cooperation Treaty appears unlikely to have a positive impact on
the problem of illegal logging.
V. THE DRAFT FOREST CODE'S APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONS,
CENTRALIZATION, AND PRIVATIZATION MAY BE EFFECTIVE IN THE
LONG-TERM, BUT CONTAINS SIGNIFICANT SHORT-TERM RISKS
The draft Russian Forest Code completed by the Russian Ministry of
Natural Resources on March 18, 2004, is a wholesale revision of both
Russia's forestry laws and its approach to its forest resources in general.
94
Although not yet approved in its final version by the Duma, 195 some of the
most controversial and potentially risky provisions appear likely to pass.
196
Among these controversial provisions are the provisions for shifting
oversight of Russia's forests to the national level' 97 and allowing the
privatization of forest lands.
198
A. The Draft Forest Code's Separation of Policy-Making, Enforcement,
and Oversight Functions Has Positive Aspects, But Also Significant
Flaws
Although the current draft of the Forest Code captures
recommendations by the World Bank that key forest functions be separated
to provide more effective checks and balances, there are problems with the
approach the Draft Forest Code takes.199 The actual functions of the three
agencies responsible for various aspects of forest management are not clear
193 See Workshop Proceedings, supra note 1, at 20.
194 See Forest Code, supra note 4.
195 The Duma is the lower of Russia's two national elected representative bodies, very roughly
equivalent in function to the U.S. House of Representatives. See Anastasia Mayberry, National Assembly:
The Russian Parliament, in THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE INTERNET: SELECTED ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LINKS, at http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/jrichardson/dis473/Russian%2OGovtParla
ment.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
196 Given President Putin's consolidation of authority within the Russian government, the Duma is
regularly described as compliant. See, e.g., US Shares Russia Poll Concerns, BBC NEWS UK, Dec. 8,
2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uklhi/world/europe/3300483.stm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) (discussing EU
and US concerns about the fairness of Russian parliamentary elections).
197 PERRY & MURAN, supra note 94, at 5.
198 Forest Code, supra note 4, at ch. 8 (explaining procedures for the lease of forest parcels).
199 See generally DIETERLE & KUSHLIN, supra note 9.
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beyond general descriptions. 200 Reporting chains, systems for interaction
between the various entities, and priorities of effort are not sufficiently
delineated in the text of the code.201 This lack of clarity at the national level
represents a major deficiency in Russia's draft code because it fails to
address one of the main problems contributing to illegal logging: weak
institutions and uncertainty as to their responsibilities.20 2
Even if the responsibilities of the three major national entities are
further detailed, this effort at institutional reform has been described as
"very ambitious and complex. 2 °3 While this does not mean that the reforms
cannot be accomplished effectively, their scope and complexity necessitate a
phased approach before some of the other, more ambitious provisions of the
new Forest Code are implemented.2 °4
The impact of the new Forest Code on sub-national institutions is
205even less clear. Specifically, the relationship between local and regional
bodies and the new national structure are not readily apparent. One of two
possibilities seems likely. The first is that the scope of the powers of "local
self-governance bodies" will not be clarified much beyond the current text,
which states that they "may be vested with certain public powers in the area
of forest use, protection, and renewal in compliance with the legislation of
the Russian Federation. ' '20 6  This language creates a disconnect between
regional and national officials, perpetuating an existing Forest Code problem
that has contributed to a lack of compliance in the RFE.
20 7
The second possibility is that as much as ninety-five percent of forest
control will be transferred to the central government, leaving only five
percent under regional control.20 8 This scenario is highly likely to occur,
given the fact that collection of the majority of forest product taxes is
expected to shift to the federal level. 20 9 This development will likely have
two negative repercussions for the RFE. First, because officials in Moscow
are less in touch with local conditions than regional officials, the forests at
the local level may receive less carefully tailored management. Second,
250 Id. at 11. See also Forest Code, supra note 4, arts. 11-13, 94-95 (delineating and describing
responsibilities of forestry agencies in general terms).
201 See generally Forest Code, supra note 4, arts. 11-13, 94-95.
202 See supra discussion on Russia's weak forestry enforcement mechanisms, Part I.B.
203 DIETERLE & KUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 11.
204 See generally id. See also Andrei A. Baev, The Privatization of Land in Russia: Reforns and
Impediments, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1994); Black et a., supra note 14; Carlsson, supra note
37.
205 See DIETERLE & KUSHLIN, supra note 9, at I 1-15.
200 Forest Code, supra note 4, art. 10, sec. 4.
207 Boots, supra note 12, at 226. See discussion of enforcement confusion, supra Part BI.A.
208 PETRY & MURAN, supra note 94, at 5.
209 SHUVARIN, supra note 77, at 2.
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local officials, having a diminished role in local forest management, will
likely feel a corresponding diminished responsibility for the forests.
Although a national forestry policy might provide a more coherent and
consistent approach, allocating more power to regional officials would
provide incentives to manage their forest stocks more effectively by
reinforcing their positions as stakeholders.21 °
B. Provisions in the Draft Forest Code Allowing Privatization of Forest
Lands Present Grave Risks Under Current Conditions in Russia
At present, the Russian government owns all of Russia's forests, but
under the Draft Forest Code a significant portion of these lands would be
released to private ownership.2 1' It is unclear whether the transfer of
ownership would take place after a long-term lease212 or immediately.213
Whichever transfer method prevails in the final legislation, estimates by
Greenpeace-Russia indicate that the measure "could lead to the privatization
of up to ninety percent of Russia's forests. 214  According to some non-
governmental sources, this privatization effort lacks transparency and may
include the possibility of privatizing nature preserves and other currently
protected areas.215  216
Given the recent history of privatization in Russia, legitimacy
problems are likely to follow a dramatic shift in property rights, particularly
in a region facing the challenges of the RFE. l If the transition process
from state to private ownership is not carefully managed, or Russian citizens
perceive mismanagement, expectations of unfairness may produce
undesirable consequences.21 8  It is highly likely that RFE residents would
2'0 The old Forest Code's mixing of central and local responsibilities made responsibilities unclear
and may have encouraged territorialism. This aspect of the new Forest Code may be a direct reaction to
those problems, albeit possibly more extreme than required. See Cymbre Van Fossen, The Evolution of a
Comprehensive Environmental Strategy in the Russian Federation, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 531, 548-54 (1995),
for a discussion of the problems of the earlier Forest Code, particularly as they relate to the problems of the
intersection of regional and national authority.
211 See Forest Code, supra note 4, ch. 8.
212 See id.
213 See SHUVARIN, supra note 77, at 2.
214 Boris Kagarlitsky, Oligarchs to Rule Regions as Forests Open for Privatization, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Russia), July 6, 2004, at 1.
215 id.
216 For a detailed discussion of the history of privatization in post-Soviet Russia, see Black, supra
note 14.
217 Carlsson, supra note 37, at 5.
218 See generally id.; Black, supra note 14.
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take their cue from the government, thus creating a free-for-all approach to
the RFE's forestry resources.219
One of the Russian government's weakest arguments in favor of
privatization is that it cannot control what currently goes on in the forests or
enforce existing laws. On the contrary, this indicates that privatization at
this stage of development is particularly risky. 220 The Russian government
should delay implementing a full privatization until its institutions are
221sufficiently developed to cope with the pressures of a free market.
VI. THE RussiAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD PURSUE AGREEMENTS WITH ITS
TRADING PARTNERS AND REVISE ITS PLAN TO PRIVATIZE RuSSIA'S
FOREST RESOURCES
The Russian government has a number of trade policy options
available which offer better solutions to the problem of illegal logging in the
RFE. Russian trade policy could include a combination of three different
approaches: unilateral measures, bilateral agreements, and multilateral
agreements. None of these measures, on its own, offers a complete solution
to the RFE's current crises. Unilateral trade measures appeal to nations
seeking to curb illegal or unsustainable logging but are a poor solution to
Russia's problems. Bilateral trade agreements address the concerns of
individual trading partners and may be easier to develop than multilateral
agreements. However, bilateral agreements may not capture all of the
relevant parties, nor provide as uniform a standard as multilateral
agreements. Finally, multilateral agreements, while achieving broad
participation, may not provide sufficiently firm standards to be effective. As
a result of the shortcomings of each of these measures individually, the best
solution for the RFE would be a combination of bilateral and multilateral
agreements.
A. Unilateral Trade Measures Are the Least Desirable Solution to the
Problem of Illegal Logging in the RFE
One of the most immediate responsive measures the Russian
government could take to address the problem of illegal logging in the RFE
would be a unilateral ban on the export of raw logs or subsidies to encourage
219 See Carlsson, supra note 37, at 5.
220 See Kagarlitsky, supra note 214.
221 See DIETERLE & KUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 2. See also SIZER ET AL., supra note 19 1, at 2 ("Trade
liberalization that could threaten forests or interfere with their protection should not go forward until
mechanisms are put into place to ensure parallel progress on forest protection.").
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sustainable harvesting practices. Such practices could do more harm than
222 223good, however, and would almost certainly fail a WTO challenge.
1. A Unilateral Ban on the Export of Raw Logs Would Be Ineffective,
Would Not Survive a WTO Challenge, and Could Alienate Key Trade
Partners
A unilateral ban on the export of raw logs would be a poor policy
decision in terms of both its effectiveness and its impact on trade relations.
Although a number of nations have attempted such unilateral bans, their
effectiveness is questionable. 224 The typical immediate effect of a ban on
the export of raw logs is a depression of local prices, which encourages even
225
more wasteful processing. Similar measures that attempted to protect
226tropical forests have resulted in greater exploitation of those resources.
Given the high demand for Russia's raw logs, 227 a ban could also shift more
of the RFE' s timber exploitation into illegal channels.
In addition, such a ban would almost certainly face a successful
228
challenge by Russia's trade partners. Japan, in particular, one of Russia's
229key trading partners, is on record as opposing raw log export bans, and
would be likely to challenge an attempted ban in the WTO.23 ° Malaysia's
successful WTO complaint against an Austrian ban on the import of raw
logs, in which Austria intended to block the importation of unsustainably
harvested logs, would serve as precedent in such a situation.231 Given its
aspirations of acceding to the WTO and maintaining positive interaction
with its key trading partners, Russia would be wise to avoid such measures.
222 Ryan K. McKain, A Critical Evaluation of the Development and Implementation of Forest
Preservation Strategies, 15 CONN. J. INT'L L. 235,239 (2000).
223 See Kibel, supra note 139, at 764-66; Chalifour, supra note 163, at 597.
224 Brian F. Chase, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Legality of Unilateral Attempts to
Promote Sustainable Development Under the GATT, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv 349, 379 (1994).
211 Id. at 380.
226 id.
227 See supra Part 1I.C for a discussion of demand for Russian timber among Northeast Asian nations.
228 See Kibel, supra note 139, at 766; Chalifour, supra note 163, at 597; Rudy S. Salo, When the Logs
Roll Over: The Need for an International Convention Criminalizing Involvement in the Global Illegal
Timber Trade, 16 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 127, 141.
229 See GORDON, supra note 18, at 6.
230 See Chalifour, supra note 163, at 597.
23t See Salo, supra note 228, at 141.
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2. Subsidies to Encourage Sustainable Forestry Practices or Encourage
the Development of Domestic Industry Are Unlikely to Survive a WTO
Challenge
Given the difficulties the forestry industry faces in the RFE, one
possibility is for the central government to subsidize forestry practices.
Subsidies could take the form of direct subsidies, tariffs on imports or
exports, artificially low licensing fees, government financed construction of
roads into timber harvesting areas, or other tactics to provide economic
incentive to domestic producers.232 Such measures have been attempted,
with mixed success, in the United States, Chile, and Canada.233
Even if subsidies to forest enterprises in the RFE were couched in
environmental protection language, however, they would be unlikely to
survive a challenge in the WTO. 23 4  The GATT makes no distinction
between environmental subsides and other forms of protection, nor does it
235allow subsidies for the development of sustainable industry. As such, on
this basis alone, a subsidy regime to protect the RFE's forests would be a
poor policy decision.
B. Regional Bilateral Agreements Offer the Best Trade-Based Solution to
the Problem of Illegal Logging in the RFE in the Immediate Future
Bilateral trade agreements appear to be the most viable trade-based
solution for Russia because they are likely to survive WTO scrutiny 236 and
are easier to achieve and implement than multilateral agreements.23' Both
232 See Chase, supra note 224, at 357-60; Hale E. Sheppard, Native Forest Protection in Chile: The
Inadequacies of the Recent Environmental Framework Law and Relevant Multilateral Instruments, 14 J.
ENVTL. L. & L1TIG. 225, 236-37 (1999); SIzER ET AL., supra note 191, at 4 (noting that among some of the
other measures that serve as subsidies are paying for road construction in logging operations, helping with
marketing, and conducting forest inventories).
233 For a discussion of subsidy regimes in British Columbia, Chile, and Russia, see Kibel, supra note
139, at 751-52. For a more detailed discussion of Chile's attempts at forest protection, see Sheppard, supra
note 232.
234 Kibel, supra note 139, at 764.
235 Id.
236 See UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, FOREST PRODUCTS ANNUAL MARKET
ANALYSIS 2002-2004, 56 UN TIMBER BULLETIN 35 (2003), U.N. Doc. ECE/TIM/BULL/2003/3, available
at http://www.unece.org/trade/timber/docs/fpama/2003/2003FPAMA-whole-doc-webversion.pdf (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005); see also PAUL TOYNE ET AL., WWF INTERNATIONAL, THE TIMBER FOOTPRINT OF
THE G8 AND CHINA: MAKING THE CASE FOR GREEN PROCUREMENT BY GOVERNMENT (2002), at
http://www.wwf.org.ukjfilelibrary/pdf/g8timberfootprint.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) (making a case
for the impact a unified G8 policy on timber procurement could have on forest markets and production).
237 See Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Why Is There No International Forest Law?: An Examination of
International Forestry Regulation, Both Public and Private, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 153 (2001)
(detailing a number of structural challenges hindering the formation of a global forest convention). See
also Robert M. Hardaway et al., Tropical Forest Conservation Legislation and Policy: A Global
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the United Nations 238 and the World Bank 23 9 have recommended bilateral
agreements generally as a partial solution to the problem of illegal logging.
The European Commission has also proposed the establishment of voluntary
bilateral agreements between the European Union and its timber-producing
trading partners.24 °
The fact that Russia already has a bilateral agreement with China that
addresses trade and environmental issues should make a further agreement
on illegal logging easy to achieve. 241  Given the two countries'
interdependence in the forestry sector242 and the Cooperation Treaty's
24language on trade and the environment,  the Cooperation Treaty could
provide the foundation for a bilateral agreement addressing the problems of
the forest trade.
A few provisions should be featured in such a bilateral agreement in
order for it to work. First, the agreement should specify the steps each trade
partner would take to enhance the effectiveness of monitoring agencies such
as national forestry and customs services. 244  Under this broad rubric, a
number of individual steps could apply, depending on the specific conditions
of trade between the involved countries. For example, in the case of trade
with China, some effective simple steps could be: establishing channels of
communications between officials on both sides of the border; training
officials to recognize protected species and grades of timber; and
establishing a holding period for timber prior to export.245
Second, the bilateral agreements should provide for an independent
monitoring mechanism instituting a chain of custody from point of
246production to point of purchase as a finished good. The model of the
independent Forest Stewardship Council's certification system may be
247
applicable in this case. Such an independent certification and monitoring
Perspective, 15 WHrrTtER L. REV. 919, 948-50 (1994) (focusing on the failure of the International Tropical
Timber Agreement to achieve results in promoting sustainable forest practices or protecting sensitive
species from overexploitation).
238 Forest Products Market Analysis, supra note 236, at 35.
239 DIETERLE & KUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 2 ("Collaboration among governmental forestry agencies,
forest industries, and local populations should be enhanced, as should Russian collaboration with European
and international forestry systems and organizations.").
240 See Forest Products Market Analysis, supra note 236, at 35.
241 See Cooperation Treaty, supra note 4, arts.16, 17, 19 & 20.
242 See Larmer, supra note 86.
243 Cooperation Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 16 & 19.
244 CoNTRERAs-HERMOSitLLA, supra note 113, at 6.
245 Id.
246 TOYNE ET AL., supra note 236, at 29.
247 Id. In general terms, the Forest Stewardship Council sends inspectors to establish that a given area
of forest is managed sustainably and that the trees in question are of legally harvestable species. The Forest
Stewardship Council also assists in developing a chain of custody system which allows end-users to trace
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system would be a particularly important step for a number of reasons. First,
an inherent problem contributing to illegal logging in the RFE is the
weakness of the systems designed to address it.248  Currently, even if
customs officials do attempt to ascertain the legal origin of a given shipment
of logs from Russia to China, the task is nearly impossible. Second, such a
system could assist Russia in achieving compliance with its own laws.24 9
This would help, incrementally, to assert that the Russian forestry sector is
moving toward the rule of law. Third, and perhaps most important, is that
this system would facilitate the export of Russian logs in a manner
consistent with end-user nations' laws. Beginning in 2006, EU countries
will block the importation of uncertified Russian forest products. 250  This
process will soon be necessary to stave off the closing of possible markets.
Finally, such bilateral agreements should require the criminalization
of illegal timber exports or imports and establish specific mechanisms to
enforce such laws. 25  In the case of trade between Russia and China, the
current civil sanctions for illegal logging are insufficient to deter illegal
behavior.252 The risk of serious criminal penalties would provide an
effective deterrent, particularly when applied to merchants and officials. 253
As with other control measures, the effectiveness of such criminal penalties
would depend on their broad and even application, both to increase the
reality of the risk and to build confidence in the rule of law.254
C. Multilateral Agreements Are the Best Long-Term Solution to the
Problem of Illegal Logging in the RFE
Multilateral agreements, whether global or regional in scope, offer
greater promise of uniformity in resolving the problem of illegal logging in
the long run than bilateral agreements, but at the cost of increased
their final purchase back to the area of harvest. This final measure is a way to create a market for
sustainably harvested timber. For a discussion of the viability of such a licensing scheme under the WTO
regime, see DUNCAN BRACK, ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, WTO IMPLICATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL TIMBER LICENSING SCHEME, THIRD DRAFT,(Mar. 12, 2003) available at http://www.riia.org/pdfbriefmgppersiLiceing%2and%20WTO%20
Brack%202003.pdf. (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
248 See discussion of weak institutions, supra Part III.B.
249 PETRY & MURAN, supra note 96, at 4.
25 id.
251 TOYNE ET AL., supra note 236, at 29; CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, supra note 113, at 6.
252 See supra discussion on inadequate legislation, Part III.A.
253 CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, supra note 113, at 6.
254 Carlsson, supra note 37, at 1.
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compromise and more complex negotiation.255 Because of their scope, they
are the "preferred way to provide credibility, legitimacy, and acceptability to
trade measures for forest products. 256  The challenge in achieving and
implementing such broad agreements means that they should probably be
viewed as a long-term approach to the problem rather than as the main
solution in the short-term. In the case of illegal logging in the RFE, the
preferred sort of multilateral agreement would be a regional agreement
rather than a global agreement.
Global agreements such as the International Treaty on Tropical
Timber have been unable to halt the illegal logging of tropical timber, a
problem very similar to that of illegal logging in the RFE.257 This may be
because the causes of illegal logging in specific regions throughout the globe
are too diverse and complicated for single, worldwide agreements to address
effectively. Alternatively, the failure of these agreements may be due to
necessary compromises in their language, which render standards and
enforcement measures ineffective. Whether either hypothesis is correct or
not, the short-term record of such agreements suggests that a more
regionally-focused approach would be appropriate for the RFE.
A more manageable and effective approach for the RFE may be
available in the form of regional agreements or agreements with trade blocs.
One proposal is that the members of the G8 group, which represents the
world's most powerful economies, as well as Russia, institute single
procurement policies within their governments to "ensure that suppliers do
not receive mixed signals about the environmental and social standards
required to secure a government contract. '258 This would reduce confusion
and complexity, and simplify enforcement of standards within the scope of
government purchasing.
Another option is for Russia, perhaps under the auspices of the Asian-
Pacific Economic Council,259 to push for the creation of a regional trade
policy pertaining to timber sales. Such a trade agreement would be
equivalent to a regional free trade area in a specific sector of commerce. It
would establish a uniform standard for all partners in the region, which
255 For a general discussion of the relative merits of various forms of international agreements, see
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED
APPROACH, ch. 2 (2002).
256 Andre Nollkaemper, Protecting Forests Through Trade Measures: The Search for Substantive
Benchmarks, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 401 (1996).
257 Hardaway et al., supra note 237, at 948 ("The [International Tropical Timber Organization] has
not been very efficient and has produced little activity.").
258 TOYNE ET AL., supra note 236, at 8.
259 The Asian-Pacific Economic Council is a trade association which includes most of Asia's free
market economies.
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would streamline production. It would also relieve timber producers of the
need to compete with other suppliers in providing the most attractive
regulatory and export regimes. This would have two immediate effects.
First, it would cut production and overhead costs by reducing complexity
and uncertainty for the timber producer. A single, uniform standard would
enable producers to configure their operations once to sell their products
throughout the regional market. This would streamline production of
timber, reduce administrative and overhead costs, and simplify the
enforcement of regulations. Second, it would reduce the ability of nations in
the region to obtain competitive advantage by having lower environmental
standards. This would, in turn, provide an incentive to a developing region
such as the RFE to husband rather than expend its natural resources.
Although a bilateral agreement might be the most effective measure
for the time being, Russia would be well advised to consider such regional,
multilateral measures as long-term solutions.
VII. CONCLUSION
To correct the causes of illegal logging in the RFE, Russia should
strengthen its trade relationships and institutions before exposing them to
unregulated free trade or rapid privatization. Facing the threat of economic
and social decline, as well as a loss of global status, Russia has naturally
sought powerful solutions for its woes. Unfortunately, the measures under
consideration are too radical and are likely to do more harm than good.
Russian society and institutions are not strong enough to cope with the twin
pressures of unregulated free trade and rapid privatization of forest
resources. Given the problems of the RFE, Russia's government should
reconsider its decision to pursue free trade and forest privatization
simultaneously. Although Russia must find a way to integrate itself into the
global marketplace, simultaneously implementing free trade and
privatization could cost Russia the very resources that could fund its future
development.
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